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Collision Course: 
Macroeconomic Policies and the Crash 
As in all  emerging market crises, the events of 1890-91 prompted the ques- 
tion ofwhat went wrong and what reforms were necessary to prevent the same 
from happening again. Policymakers faced intense pressure both domestically 
and internationally, but what options did they have? By way of addressing the 
problem, this chapter considers the macroeconomic policy choices open to Ar- 
gentina in the years before, during, and after the Baring Crisis.  Stabilization 
and the resumption of growth were the principal objectives for the authorities, 
but having to work within a small-open economy placed limits on the feasibil- 
ity and compatibility of various policy goals.  In particular, we will be asking 
what room for maneuver existed under the constraints imposed by public debt 
management, inflation policy, and the choice of exchange-rate regime. 
The link between monetary policy, inflation, and the exchange rate is, we 
hope, by this point quite evident. In preceding chapters we have discussed the 
general contours of Argentine monetary and credit policies in the 1880s. We 
saw that, in the medium and long run, a sustained expansion of unbacked paper 
notes was closely correlated with changes in the domestic price level and in the 
paper-gold exchange rate. For example, from 1884 to 1891, the monetary base 
grew at an average annual rate of 17.9 percent while prices increased by 16.6 
percent and the paper peso depreciated at an average rate of 18.8 percent. 
This evidence  pushes the explanation of inflation one step back by recognizing 
its monetary origin, but it does not tell us very much about the determinants of 
monetary policy itself. What lay behind the expansionary monetary policy of 
the 1880s that, ex post, destroyed the fixed parity and devastated the domestic 
financial system?  Likewise, even as  we  note  the close link between  steady 
deflation and the freeze of the money stock in the 1890s, can we explain how 
such a tight monetary policy proved feasible at a time when public memories 
of inflationary abuses were still very fresh? 
To study these more fundamental political-economy questions, we will need 
to complement our quantitative monetary history discussion with an assess- 
ment of the national government’s fiscal performance. In this chapter we show 
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Table 4.1. Fiscal Revenues, Expenditures, and Public Debt, 1884-1 913 
Period  1884  1887  1890  1891  1892  1900  1906 
-87  -89  -99  -05  -13 
A. Sources of Fiscal Revenue (as Percentages of  Total Ordinary Revenue) 
(1)  Import Tariff  65  69  65  63  60  45  55 
(3) Consumption Taxes  0  0  0  3  10  21  16 
(2) Export Taxes  6  1  0  0  8  6  0 
(4) Direct Taxes  10  12  13  11  6  7  7 
(5) Public Enterprises  10  5  4  3  7  10  10 
B. Expenditures by Function (as Percentages of  Total Expenditures) 
(6) Interior  32  36  44  36  27  30  43 
(7) Defense  20  17  17  15  26  19  17 
(8) Justice and Education  10  10  9  6  8  8  12 
(10) Debt Service  23  17  17  34  29  37  21 
C. Average Levels (as Percentages): 
(11)PublicDebt/Expenditures  270  350  630  740  680  540  320 
(12) Expenditures/Output  15  15  10  10  13  12  11 
(13) Debt(Variant2)/0utput  41  52  65  72  78  67  40 
(14) External DebdOutuut  27  28  36  39  58  58  24 
(9) Finance  15  17  18  7  11  5  5 
Notes and sources:  See Appendix 1. 
that monetary stability-and,  hence, the viability of a gold standard regime- 
depended primarily on the state of public finances. Thus, given the importance 
we will accord to the federal budget in the evolution of domestic macroeco- 
nomic policies, we shall first briefly consider Argentina’s public finances in the 
period by examining the pattern of the national administration’s revenues, ex- 
penditures, and debt. 
Fiscal Revenues, Expenditures, and Public Debt 
Any discussion of Argentina’s fiscal position in the nineteenth century must 
begin with the observation that revenues were heavily dependent on taxes im- 
posed on international trade. Table 4.1, Part A, shows that the most significant 
tax sources were import duties, accounting for about two thirds of revenues in 
the decade that preceded the Baring Crisis and one half thereafter. 
The relative decline of trade taxes  in the 1890s was  accompanied by the 
rise in importance of internal excise (consumption) taxes and by the growth of 
revenues derived from the development of public enterprises. This proved to 
be a vital part of the economic reform package.  And, as we shall see, such a 
shift in the composition of fiscal revenue is highly revealing of the way in which 
political-economy considerations shaped the way tax policies would be applied 
after the crash to erase the deficits of the public sector. 
We  should note that export taxes were much less important: they had essen- 82  Straining at the Anchor 
tially a temporary character, being eliminated in the years of burgeoning public 
debt. From a trade-theoretic standpoint, the Lerner symmetry theorem tells us 
that import and export taxes are substitutes, and have identical effects on the 
volume of trade and economic efficiency when trade is balanced.  Even so, the 
asymmetric tax treatment of imports and exports can reveal political cleavages 
and is economically important in the short run. The tax structure shows how, 
even during periods of extreme fiscal distress, policy was shaped by the politi- 
cal complexion of Argentine society, especially the power and influence of the 
rural sector. And the differential treatment of exports and imports matters in 
the short run whenever trade deficits or surpluses have to be run to maintain 
external current account balance. 
That such rent-seeking forces could affect the formation of the federal budget 
had important public-debt management consequences-the  implicit tax loop- 
holes given to the export industry narrowed the tax base and limited the range 
of fiscal policy options. For example, given this import-biased tax structure, the 
postcrash macroeconomic adjustment that required an increase in exports and 
a reduction in imports to service the overhanging external debt would, neces- 
sarily, produce a decline in fiscal revenues and place additional pressures on the 
budgetary situation.  Thus, the 1891 introduction of internal excise taxes by 
the Pellegrini administration was intended to partially overcome this rigidity 
by relying more on the domestic economy to raise revenues. 
The composition of national administration expenditures is given in Panel 
B ofTable 4.1. Except during the 1892-99 deflationary period, the dominant 
component of expenditures was the Ministry of the Interior. A precise break- 
down of expenditures in these categories is not available in the official sources 
on an annual basis.'  However, from fragmentary evidence we conclude that 
capital expenditures were the main driving force behind the increase in the 
ministry's outlays in the late 1880s. In 1888 public works defined as the sum 
of railway construction, dock works, public buildings, migration subsidies, tele- 
graph works, and railroad guarantees accounted for 56 percent of government 
purchases. This proportion grew to a remarkable 73 percent by 1889, or 34.2 
percent of total government expenditures inclusive of finance and debt service.2 
After a marked period of decline in 1892-99,  in which capital expenditures 
were cut in favor of defense expenditures, the next upsurge in public-sector 
investments came in the early 1910s. It is striking that on this later occasion 
they were exclusively financed with the issue of long-term internal bonds. 
One of the most surprising and important aspects of the Argentine federal 
budget is the evolution of funds assigned to service and amortize debt. During 
the years  1884-90,  in spite of the increase in the stock of debt relative  to 
1. Martinez (1898, pp. 321-80). 
2. Estimates from Duncan (1983, pp. 11-34).  His estimates are based on Memorias de Hacienda 
for the years 1888-89  (see Cuadro 10  and Cuadro 11 on p. 270). Collision Course  83 
national expenditures, the debt service share of expenditures declined, a fact 
that Table 4.1, because of its average-year calculation, does not fully reflect.’ 
This countervailing movement of debt stock and service payments shows not 
that the burden in terms of expenditures was actually reduced, but rather that 
the paper pesos budgeted  did not suffice to cover  the normal service of the 
internal and external debt.“ 
If we estimate the “true” service and amortization of the debt for the years 
1884-91,  we can see  a marked divergence between  the “true” expenditures 
and the amounts budgeted.  For the year 1889,  budgeted funds covered only 
44  percent of required service payments and only 56 percent in 1890. These 
estimates imply that the official expenditure figures for these same years might 
have been underestimated by around 12.5 percent?  Conversely, for the 1893- 
97 years, in which the Romero-Bank  of England agreement was in force, the 
paper peso funds assigned by the budget to service the debt exceeded the “true” 
service of the debt.  Here the level of federal expenditures might have been 
overestimated then on average by about 7 percent. Thus, the budget procedures 
apparently included in them an implicit sinking fund arrangement to permit 
the resumption of full service in the years 1898-1905. 
A measure of the importance of the federal budget relative to economic 
activity is given by federal spending as  a share of real output.  The numbers, 
while not conveying an exact measure on a year-to-year basis, approximate the 
impact of the government  on the Argentine economy.  We can see that, on 
average, Argentine federal expenditures stood between 12 and 14 percent of 
real output.  While the relative size of the government may appear small by 
today’s standards, it appears very large under a cross-country comparison in 
the same time period.  For example, in the last twenty years of the nineteenth 
century, the federal expenditures of the United States averaged only 3 percent 
of gross domestic product. The large Argentine public sector looked much like 
the Italian case, where central government spending amounted to 10 percent 
of national output during the years of the international gold standard.6 
The influence of the federal budget on the course of the macroeconomic 
3. The  debt service shares in the federal budget were as following: in 1887,23 percent; 1888,21 
percent; 1889, 17  percent; and 1890,14 percent.  See Appendix 1. 
4. This was first noted by Duncan (1983, p.  22): “Asi vemos, pues que en 1888 hubo un cambio 
tan marcado de prioridades en el presupuesto que lleva a reflexionar sobre su funcion.. .. Como 
resultado, el gobierno nacional  solo pudo cubrir 3/5 de sus gastos anuales en servicio de la 
deuda con el gasto presupuestado durante 1889 y 1890. Las restantes proporciones hubo que 
buscarlas en otros lados: en 10s recursos extraordinarios, o en las reservas.” 
5. The estimation is based on Memorias de Hacienda, “Cuadro demostrativo de la deuda consoli- 
dada de la Republica Argentina,” for the years 1884-91.  The table breaks down the public debt 
by bond issue and includes the yearly amortization of each of them. The interest payments 
were calculated by applying to the residual values of the bonds their respective stated interest 
rates.  Duncan (1983) compares the budgeted service with the Williams (1920) estimates of 
the foreign debt service. 
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Figure 4.1. Federal Funded Debt, 18861914 
1883  1888  1893  1898  1903  1908  1913 
Notes andsources: Units are millions of gold pesos. See Appendix 1. 
policies was  most strongly felt through the size of the federal public funded 
debt.  Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of federal debt (and the external debt) 
measured in millions of gold pesos. In  Table 4.1 the debt is first shown in row 
11 as  a proportion of real output.  This series (Debt Variant 1) includes the 
stock of external bonds (floated to finance capital expenditures and refinance 
the internal debt) and the stock of internal long-term bonds. A second series in 
row 13  (Debt Variant 2) employs a broader definition and includes, in addition, 
the debt incurred by virtue of the Law of National Guaranteed Banks. 
The  difference in the evolution of the two series shows two important trends. 
First, the accumulation of debt in relation to monetary and banking problems 
was indeed substantial, accounting for almost 30 percent of the total debt by 
1891. Second, the supposedly explosive debt creation for developmental pur- 
poses may have been overstated by earlier researchers of the period.’ 
After the crash, during the time of disinflation, there were basically two 
main influences on the level of public debt. The first major influence was the 
floatation in 1891-92 of the de la Plaza-Bank  of England funding loan that 
7. This was recognized by  CortCs Conde (1987, p.  16): “In December 1889 the external debt 
increased by 48 million gold pesos because of debt conversion. This fact gives a misleading 
impression of the new sources of funds during the second half of the decade.. ..  Except for the 
1885 public works loan which starts to flow in by 1886, and the loans related to the northern 
railroad for 19 million pesos, there were no other new funds.” Collision Course  85 
rolled over the national administration’s  foreign debt service. The  positive effect 
that this loan had on the level of indebtedness was partially offset in 1892-95 
when the fiscal authorities amortized almost completely the stock of interest- 
yielding gold bonds, the bonds issued before the Baring Crisis to back part of 
the guaranteed notes! 
The  second and most important influence was the absorption by the national 
administration of the delinquent external debt of the provinces; the 1897-1900 
upsurge in the level of the federal debt stems from the 120 million gold pesos 
of external provincial debt that were converted into national external bonds? 
In short, we emphasize that the upward trend in debt during the 1890s is not 
a reflection of the government having renewed access to international capital 
markets but rather is the result of the consolidation of old provincial debts. 
After 1900,  the tide turned at last.  During Argentina’s gold standard years 
the stock of public debt relative to output declined dramatically from 78 percent 
in 1899 to 40 percent on average in the years 1906-13.  Its composition also 
changed. There was a slow but steady policy of external debt retirement and, 
most important, once the regime appeared credible over time, there was better 
access to domestic capital markets once Argentine investors were more willing 
to hold government long-term internal bonds.  On  the eve of the First World 
War, almost half of the funded debt, an amount roughly equal to 20 percent of 
national output, was floated in the Buenos Aires stock exchange. The  domestic 
capital market that had been decimated by the Baring Crisis appeared, by then, 
to be getting back firmly on its feet. 
Debt, Deficits, and Inflation 
Given these preliminary remarks, we now develop a more formal analysis of the 
policy environment before and during the crash to examine whether the Baring 
Crisis had its roots in the design of inconsistent macroeconomic policies. 
Given a pattern of expenditures in excess of revenues, the fiscal authority can 
finance its budget deficits DEFt in two ways:  by selling public bonds in the 
capital market over and above the value of bonds being retired or by issuing 
paper money (domestic credit), or both, so that 
DEFt =  Bt -  Bt-1  +  DCt -  DCt-1,  (4.1) 
where DCt is domestic credit. To establish a link between budget deficits and 
the price level we introduce the money market equilibrium condition 
8. In 1891 the outstanding stock of guaranteed bonds amounted to 85.5 million gold pesos and 
by 1895 only 6.5 million. See Appendix 1. 
9. By 1896-97,  the amount of provincial bonds in default amounted to 116 million gold pesos, 
representing this a 28 percent  of the total national debt.  Figures are from Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders (1897, p.  349) under the heading “Principal Loans in Default.” British 
pounds were converted at the rate of 1  pound = 5.04 gold pesos. 86  Straining  at  the  Anchor 
MBtIPt =  Lt,  (4.2) 
where MBt is the money base at time t ,  Pt  is the price level at time t,  and Lt 
is the demand for real money base at time t. 
By definition, under a gold standard regime, money base equals domestic 
credit DC, plus specie reserves S,.  It is equal to domestic credit DCt under a 
pure fiduciary regime, so that 
MBt  =  DCt +  S,, in a gold standard regime; 
MBt  =  DCt ,  in a fiduciary regime. 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
As an example, to cleanly isolate the correlation between budget deficits and 
inflation rates let us assume, for the moment, a fixed demand for real monetary 
base Lt = L. Suppose also that the fiscal authority has hit a debt ceiling, or 
cannot augment credit, so that Bt =  Bt-l. Then the government must, under 
these circumstances, fully monetize the deficit.” Equation (4.1) then becomes 
DEFt =  DCt -  DCt-1.  (4.5) 
How will such deficits affect monetary equilibrium? Under the assumption 
of a fixed demand for base L,  equilibrium in the money market under a gold 
standard regime implies that the nominal base should remain the same despite 
the continuous increase in its domestic credit component DCt and this can 
be accomplished only by a proportionate decrease in specie reserves. Under a 
fiduciary regime the monetary equilibrium is restored with a proportionate rise 
in prices and, via purchasing power parity (PPP),  the exchange rate.” Thus, 
DEFt =  DCt -  DCt-l = -(St -  St-l), in a gold standard regime;  (4.6) 
DEFt  DCt -DC*-1  dPt  dEt 
--  -  -  -  ,  in a fiduciary regime.  (4.7) 
DCt-1  DCt-1  Pt-1  Et-1 
where dPt/Pt-l represents the percentage change in the price level equal to the 
percentage change in the exchange rate dEf/Et-l given fixed world prices P*.” 
10. Here we have assumed a fixed demand for simplicity. However, to generate the above linkages 
it is sufficient that changes in supply dominate changes in the demand for monetary base. This 
was basically the Argentine experience for 1884-91. 
11. Recall that in a gold standard regime under the PPP assumption, the level of domestic prices 
is determined in the world markets by P = EP*. Therefore, given the demand for real base 
and given world prices the nominal base should remain the same to insure equilibrium in the 
money market. We discuss evidence in favor of PPP in Appendix 4. 
12. Note that ifthe government is severely credit constrained, so that Bt  is zero (all debt suddenly 
matures and no debt can be rolled over). Ifthere is no immediate fiscal adjustment to reduce the 
deficit then the threat to monetary or price stability is greatly magnified because of the required 
amortization of the stock of debt B,-1.  In this case, expressions (4.6) and (4.7) become 
DEFt +  Bt-l  = -(Sf  -  St+]),  in a gold standard regime; 
DEFt+Bf-1  dPf  dEt  . 
DCf-1  Pf-1  Ef-1 
-  -  ,  in a fiduciary regime. Collision Course  87 
Equations (4.1) and (4.6) show that deficits are not inflationary if the au- 
thorities can finance them by borrowing or by running down specie reserves, or 
both. But equation (4.6) illustrates the well-known proposition that in a credi- 
ble gold-standard regime governments cannot persistently use money creation 
as  a source of revenue because specie reserves would eventually be depleted, 
forcing the country to adopt a fiduciary regime as in equation (4.7).13 
Here, balance of payments crises become a public finance phenomenon once 
the government of a small open economy can no longer borrow from capital 
markets to finance a chronic primary deficit. The Argentine historical experi- 
ence fits well with this description. Table 4.2 shows that the federal government 
did not collect enough revenues to cover its expenditures and so ran persistent 
flow deficits from 1885 to 1892. We should recall that immediately after the 
1885  demise of the bimetallic standard the monetary authorities precommitted 
themselves to restore convertibility early in 1887. The conduct of fiscal pol- 
icy seemed to have supported this goal since the 1886-87  budget deficits were 
sharply reduced relative to both expenditures and receipts. The fiscal scenario 
dramatically changed in 1888  when, in only one year, fiscal expenditures inclu- 
sive of debt service payments grew by 41 percent and fiscal receipts remained 
steady. From then on, until some fiscal adjustment took place the federal gov- 
ernment typically had to raise additional revenues equal to almost two thirds of 
receipts to cover the flow deficits. Only during the 1892-93 reform years did 
fiscal budgets converge toward balance-expenditures  were frozen in nominal 
terms but the gap was closed by a rise in receipts. 
How did the economy respond to this set of policy choices? Table 4.3 shows 
the exchange rate, the budget deficit, the inflation rate, changes in the level 
of the public debt, and reserves during the crisis.  It is true that there is no 
direct evidence on the flow of paper notes directly advanced to the treasury by 
the banks of issue; however, here, inferences can still be made and theory can 
substitute for facts. The  counterfactual inflation rate was constructed under the 
assumption that, in each year, federal deficits were completely financed with 
issues of paper notes. In other words, if fiscal deficits had been fully monetized, 
yet other  factors such as output and money velocity had remained approximately 
the same, what would have happened with the inflation rate?I4 
13. Reserves may even be exhausted in an instant by a speculative attack (Krugman 1979). 
14.  The counterfactual  inflation  rate  is  constructed as  follows.  First, assuming the  deficit is 
fully monetized, the counterfactual growth of paper money %%cF,~  is the deficit (column 
3)  divided by  the outstanding stock of paper  notes.  Thus,  following equation  (4.1),  let 
DEFt/DC,_I  = (DCt_l -  DCt_l)/DCtpl = MBcF,,.  Now, paper money in circula- 
tion MBt times the velocity Vt must equal output Yt  times the price level Pt ,  so that MBt Vt 
= YtPt. Log differentiating, and inserting the counterfactual money growth, we obtain 
By assuming that output and velocity behave as they did (in both actual and counterfactual 
scenarios), we can solve for counterfacmal inflation PcF,~.  The  data are from Appendix 1. 88  Straining at the Anchor 
Table 4.2. Federal Budget, 1885-93 
Year  1885  1886  1887  1888  1889  1890  1891  1892  1893 
Millions of Paper Pesos  ~- 
Receipts  36  42  52  52  73  73  76  111  125 
Expenditure  55  56  68  76  107  96  127  128  123 
Corrected Expenditure  56  58  68  86  121  115  128  128  123 
Corrected Budget Deficit  19  16  16  34  48  42  52  17  -2 
Millions of  Gold Pesos 
Receipts  27  30  38  35  41  28  20  34  39 
Expenditure  40  40  50  51  60  37  34  39  38 
Corrected Expenditure  41  42  50  58  67  45  34  39  38 
Corrected Budget Deficit  14  11  12  23  27  16  14  5  -1 
Corrected Dejcif as Percen fage  of: 
Receipts  53  38  32  66  66  58  69  15  -2 
Corrected Expenditure  35  27  24  40  40  37  41  13  -2 
Notes andsources: Corrected expenditures are reported expenditures plus the difference between 
the debt service realized and budgeted. See text and Appendix 1. 
For 1885 the inflation rate is  closely matched  by  the counterfactual rate, 
which suggests that the monetary authorities may have monetized a consider- 
able proportion of the budget deficit. This possibility is well supported by the 
fact that the federal government appeared to have been credit constrained and 
had to amortize part of the public debt stock. In 1886 and 1887,  debt played 
a leading role as a mean to finance the deficit; consequently, there was no clear 
correlation between deficits and inflation rates in those years. 
Why was debt finance available? The primary deficit in Table 4.3 shows a 
healthier budgetary situation that may have positively influenced public percep- 
tion of the government’s ability to meet its service obligations without resorting 
to inflationary finance, making the promise of a return to parity more credi- 
ble.  This, in turn meant that the government could float more public bonds 
in the capital markets and at better prices, since there is a direct link between 
the market value of government debt and the market’s forecast for prospective 
deficits. In fact, it can be shown that as a consequence of the long-run budget 
constraint, or solvency condition, the market value of the government’s debt at 
any time is equal to the present value of the government’s primary surpl~ses.’~ 
15. For  a detailed discussion on the links between public debt and fiscal policy see Dornbusch, 
Blanchard, and Buiter (1986) and Sargent (1986). For an analysis ofthe linkages among public 
finances, credit ceilings, and the market valuation of the public debt in relation with developing- 
country debt problems see Sjaastad (1983). Formally the link between the value of the debt 
and fiscal surpluses is as follows. Setting DCt =  DCt-l  the government budget implies that 
Bt = -SURt  +  (1  +  it)Bf-l,  where SURt = Tt -  Gt is the nominal primary surplus at time 
t.  Solving recursively forward in time and imposing a no-Ponzi-game  condition yields 
which states that the value of the debt outstanding equals the present value of future surpluses. Collision Course  89 
Table 4.3. Fiscal Deficits, Inpation, and Public Debt, 1885-93 
Paper-Gold  Total  Corrected  Conterfacmal 
Exchange  Paper  Budget  Primaty  Inflation  Inflation 
Year  Rate  Notes  Deficit  Deficit  Rate  Rate 
1885  1.37  74.8  20.1  5.4  22.8  24.1 
1886  1.39  89.2  15.9  -1.0  3.1  8.8 
1887  1.35  97.3  16.3  0.4  -4.0  3.3 
1888  1.48  129.5  34.2  15.1  0.0  7.9 
1889  1.80  163.7  48.1  18.9  19.8  31.2 
1890  2.58  245.1  42.2  12.8  40.9  19.7 
1891  3.74  261.4  52.2  8.8  56.2  62.3 
1892  3.29  281.6  17.1  -15.7  -20.6  -21.8 
1893  3.24  306.7  -2.2  -38.8  -6.0  -12.1 
Change in  Change in  Yield  Yield  Spread over  Spread over 
Public Debt  Specie  Internal  External  Rendita  British 
Year  (Variant 2)  Reserves  Bond  Bond  Italiana  Consol 









23.8  9.1  7.86 
10.5  -5.3  8.79 
34.0  23.8  8.02 
43.1  -31.2  8.01 
11.8  -6.3  10.34 
15.7  -0.8  10.28 
56.7  0.4  9.15 
1.7  1.2  8.73 
5.93  1.79  2.93 
5.48  1.02  2.48 
5.18  0.66  2.18 
5.17  0.59  2.37 
5.83  1.23  2.93 
7.58  2.87  4.67 
7.51  2.85  4.71 
7.70  3.07  4.90 
Notes andsources: Exchange rate is paper pesos per gold peso. Total notes and deficits in millions 
of paper pesos. Inflation and interest rates in percent.  Change in public debt and change in 
specie reserves in millions of gold pesos.  See Appendix 1. 
Hence there was a positive reaction to the improved fiscal and monetary 
indicators. By 1888-89 bond prices had started to rise and so, ips0 facto, yields 
were falling (Table 4.3).  Another important development was a fall in “country 
risk” assessed by foreign investors and likely correlated with the perceptions of 
the government’s solvency position.  There was a large decline in the spread 
on bonds relative to both a comparable European long-term bond (the Rendita 
Italiana) and the British consol, evidence of  the government’s good credit ratings 
in the international capital markets. 
The fiscal discipline was short lived, and it was precisely then that the pub- 
lic finances were derailed.  In 1888, despite a clear worsening in the budget 
situation, we can see that the inflation and depreciation rates are not closely 
associated with the counterfactual inflation rate. How was this possible? 
Recall that 1888  was the only year in  which the monetary authorities respected 
the rules of the game established by the Law of Guaranteed Banks, laws that 
provided for gold-backed  paper note issue.  This is evidenced by the close 
association between the increase in paper notes and the increase in the stock of 90  Straining at the Anchor 
specie inTable 4.3. But we note also that specie reserves, in turn, were matched 
by an increase in the level of public debt. 
The causation is  clear given the institutional background of the previous 
chapters:  banking reform was  financed by  an arbitrage operation  involving 
loans negotiated abroad.  Basically, the expansion of a gold-backed monetary 
base was a key component of the expansionary fiscal policy, and there were no 
dramatic changes in the price level or the paper-gold exchange rate. 
As we have seen, the fiscal regime clearly changed early in 1889 when the 
Argentine government decided to pay off in paper pesos part of the debt de- 
nominated in gold. This was tantamount to a partial default by the Argentine 
government on its contractual obligations. As one might expect, the interna- 
tional financial community reacted in anger. For example, harsh judgment was 
passed by  The Economist on May 25, 1889, in an article entitled “Argentine 
Untrustworthiness”: 
That those who are now protesting against the claim of the Argentine Government to 
pay off the Hard Dollars Loan in paper have justice on their side is unquestionable.. .the 
claim of the Argentine Government comes as an opportune reminder that in its dealings 
with its creditors it is not to be trusted, and it is well that this fact should be brought home 
to investors, because it would appear that before long it will be attempting  to raise money 
here..  .but the experience that has lately been gained of its financial untrustworthiness, 
exemplified both in its dealings with bondholders and its refusal to respect its own laws, 
ought to make investors little disposed to respond to fresh appeals. 
It is hard to find an economic rationale for this abrupt change in the debt- 
service regime. It is even harder to understand why the government embarked 
on a policy that combined a partial repudiation of its debt, thus damaging its 
capital market reputation, with a protracted intervention in the foreign exchange 
market to stabilize the value of the “guaranteed” paper notes.  The interven- 
tion in the foreign exchange market was a futile strategy because the public- 
correctly-anticipated  that the “dirty float” monetary policy would soon shift 
from the announced convertibility-resumption  objective and end up being a 
tool for fiscal profligacy.  A massive flight from paper currency into specie, an 
intense currency substitution, resulted. 
The monetary and fiscal inconsistency became apparent by the end of the 
year  1889. The government, already under a debt-ceiling constraint and with 
its specie reserves almost depleted,  had no  choice but to switch from debt 
finance to money creation to cover an ongoing budget deficit. For the 1889- 
91 period, the accumulated inflation rate (163.7 percent) and the accumulated 
depreciation rate (152.7 percent) are closely correlated with the accumulated 
counterfactual inflation rate (154.9 percent). It seems that in the midst of the 
crisis inconvertible paper notes were issued almost exclusively for the purpose 
of financing fiscal deficits. In this way, the world’s first emerging-market crisis 
got underway. Cartoon 4.1. La crisis delprogreso. -  Tenia gue suceder,  Sefiora; cargado como lo esta, guizo ir tan 
arriba.. .  gueperdio e/egui/ibrio. (The crisis of progress. -  It  had to happen, Madam; burdened like 
that, he wanted to go so high. ..that he lost his balance.) 
Notes: The  Baring Crisis, the crash being depicted by the country (elpais) falling from a precarious 
position high atop a pile of seats. Each of the seats bears the name of a failing bank. Seat and bank 
are the same word in Spanish (banco)-a  play on words. Falling from the country’s arms and bag 
are piles of debts (cidulas, titulos, etc.). Finance Minister Vicente Fidel L6pez is the one doing the 
explaining; listening is public opinion. 
Source: Elmosquito, atio 27, no.  1422,  April 13, 1890. 92  Straining at  the Anchor 
Before the curtain fell in 1891,  the drama concluded with an economic policy 
that had finally exhausted all the available genuine means of finance and heavily 
relied on the inflation tax to finance the budget. The inflation tax and currency 
substitution interacted in unfortunate ways that exacerbated the fiscal problem. 
If there is  a high sensitivity of velocity to inflation (a greater propensity for 
currency substitution) then this will imply a higher inflation rate for the same 
level of deficit, all else equal.  Moreover, currency substitution will lower the 
base for the inflation tax, requiring an even higher inflation rate to sustain the 
same fiscal gap.  l6 
Interest Rates in the Crisis 
We cannot conclude a discussion of the crisis without giving some consider- 
ation as to its effect on the domestic credit market.  As is well known from 
recent experience, one of the main side effects of monetary and financial crises 
in emerging markets can be a sudden and large increase in interest rates for 
short-term  loans.  These can result from either active policies of the central 
bank to restrict credit or, alternatively, from the upward revision of inflationary 
expectations in the market once a fixed exchange-rate peg starts to crumble and 
devaluation fears set in. 
What can we say about short-term interest rates during the Baring crisis? 
Unfortunately, until 1901,  there is a lack of reliable direct information on the 
values of the market short-term interest rates and only scattered facts could be 
gathered from Ricardo Pillado’s  biweekly report “Revista Econ6mica” published 
in the newspaper La Prensu. In  June and July reports of 1890,  Pillado asserted 
that the official banks were still rolling over loans at a 10 to 12 percent annual 
rate, but he observed that there was no credit available on the margin at those 
rates.  Several quotations suggest that money-lending activities flourished and 
that transactions were made at unusually high discount rates. 
However, by an appeal to theory, we can move beyond anecdotes and indi- 
rectly infer the impact of the Juarez Celman’s inflationary policies on domestic 
nominal and real interest rates.  Of course, we do have data on long-term in- 
terest rates, and a perusal of Table 4.3 seems to indicate, at first glance, that 
inflationary expectations were not incorporated into the expected return of as- 
sets denominated in paper pesos.  But such an inference could be far off the 
mark once it is realized that the yield reported is  the yield to maturity of a 
long-term internal government bond. The yield to maturity is the interest rate 
that equates the discounted value of payments received from the bond with its 
16. For illustration,  the 1885 deficit in real terms equaled 20.7 million paper pesos in 1886 prices, 
and it was financed with an inflation rate of 24.6 percent. The 1891 deficit was almost exactly 
the same in real terms, 20.6 million 1886 pesos, but then it required a 63.2 percent inflation 
rate.  Here, the 1885 deficit of 20.1 million is deflated by 0.97, while the 1891 deficit of 52.2 
million is deflated by 2.53. See Appendix 1. Collision Course  93 
Table 4.4.  Conjectural Short-term Interest Rates, 1890-91 
If the Juirez Celman 
administration and the inflation 
were expected to last:  1  Year  2 Years  4 Years 
and a 9% short rate would 
resume thereafter:  54.5  31.8  20.4 
and an 8% short rate would 
resume thereafter:  88.5  48.3  28.1 
with a 9% rate for 5 years, then 8% the 
next 5, and a 7% rate thereafter:  107.5  57.3  32.1 
and expected short term rates coincided 
with the ex post  historical interest rates:  120.3  63.4  35.0 
Notes and sources: The approximate average maturity of the Argentine bond was 35 years; the 
estimated yield for 1890-91  was 10.3 percent.  Rates are in percent and their calculation is  a 
straightforward  application of the formula in the text. For example, the first entry i =  0.545 was 
found by solving the expression 0.103 = (1 x  i +  34 x 0.09)/35. The  final row of interest rates 
was estimated by taking, in each case, the actual bond yields for 1892-1900  and bank discount 
rate for 1901 onward.  The bank discount rates are taken from Comitt Nacional de Geografia 
(1941, p. 430). 
market value and, as is well known, a bond’s term to maturity affects its interest 
rate. 
A link between short and long rates can be estimated based on the theory of 
the term structure of interest rates. The theory states that the yield on a long 
bond will equal the average of short-term  interest rates that people expect to 
occur over the life span of the long bond.” Thus, the yield on a T-period long 
bond is approximately equal to 
it +  Etit+i + . .  . +  Etit+T--l 
T 
YIELD* =  (4.8) 
where T is the number of periods to maturity, it is the time t one period interest 
rate, and Etit+j is the time t +j  one period interest rate expected at time t. 
Hence, by malung some controlled conjectures on the expected postcrisis short- 
term nominal rates (conditional on the public’s expectations as to the duration of 
the inflationary upsurge) one can guess the likely range of short-term nominal 
interest rates during the Baring Crisis years. 
Our guesswork is shown in Table 4.4, and it suggests that short-term nom- 
inal rates may have greatly exceeded the reported long bond yields, under the 
assumption that people perceived Juarez Celman’s policies as likely to last only 
a short period of time.  We think it reasonable to limit the expected duration 
of Juirez Celman’s regime to one or two years for two reasons. First, in 1889, 
the Executive had lost the support of Congress when the coalition that brought 
Juarez Celman into power broke down. Second, the social and political unrest 
that erupted in 1890 increased the likelihood of a drastic change in the future 
17. Mishkin (1986, pp.  140-45). 94  Straining  at  the  Anchor 
course of the economy. The revolutionary forces of 1890,  headed by the newly 
founded Civic Union, later renamed the Radical Civic Union (Uni6n Civica 
Radical), denounced the depreciation of the paper money, the disarray of the 
public finances, and the implications for the country of an open policy of debt 
repudiation. There were two likely scenarios at this stage: either Jurirez Celman 
would limp along and painfully struggle to the end of his constitutional term 
in 1892, or he would quite possibly be overthrown well before that time.18 
As  an additional  check on our guesswork, we can note that the range of 
values for the nominal rates of interest  simulated in Table 4.4 are consistent 
with the impact on Argentine interest rates of arbitrage in the foreign exchange 
market.  During the 1880s Argentina had suddenly became well integrated 
into the world economy and the foreign exchange market was an active margin 
on which domestic prices and interest rates were determined.  With British 
annual discount rates averaging 4 to 5 percent and the paper peso expected to 
depreciate by 50 or 60 percent per year, short-term interest rates ought to have 
been, as a conservative guess, about 60 to 70 percent. 
Finally, a sharp upsurge in short-term interest rates is entirely consistent with 
what we know about credit contraction in the banking sector.  Bank created 
money shrank by 8 percent  in 1890 and by  a massive 64 percent  after the 
demise of the official banks in 1891. Such a collapse of intermediation would 
be expected to drive up the price of short-term lending. 
The  Agenda for Reform 
We conclude that the collapse of Argentine financial and monetary institutions 
was a direct consequence of domestic macroeconomic mismanagement.  The 
plan for growth through financial expansion had been built on the same explo- 
sive foundations as failed schemes of the past, such as the Mississippi Bubble.” 
As before, appeals to the fundamentally flawed “needs of trade” (or “real bills”) 
doctrine of money and banking could not disguise an uncontrolled fiscal and 
monetary profligacy that directly contradicted the commitment to parity. 
Up to a point international capital markets accommodated the precrash de- 
velopments in domestic economic policy. A boom in lending originated in the 
London market after the Goschen debt conversion of 1887,  and this temporar- 
18. The  political economy issues were explicitly stated in the revolutionary manifesto ofJuly 1890: 
“Al Pueblo: .... El patriotismo nos obliga a proclamar la revolution como recurso extrerno y 
necesario para evitar la ruina del pais.. .. Pero acatar y rnantener un gobierno que representa 
la ilegalidad y la corrupcion; ver desaparecer dia por dia las reglas, 10s principios, las garantias 
de toda adrninistracibn pliblica regular, consentir  10s  avances al tesoro, la adulteracion de la 
moneda, el despilfarro de la renta,. .  .esperar la hora de la bancarrota internacional que nos 
deshonraria ante el extranjero seria consagrar la impunidad del abuso.. .” (Sabsay 1975, pp. 
611-14). 
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ily eased the access of the Argentine government to external bond finance.2” 
During the early stages of the boom foreign investors were persuaded that the 
paper peso would return to par, and hence they heavily invested in assets de- 
nominated in paper pesos. Yet  domestic residents, perhaps with better or, in 
some cases, inside information, started to bet against the paper peso?’ 
The information asymmetry could not last forever.  When foreign expecta- 
tions were revised, an extreme credit-rationing  situation precipitated an infla- 
tionary upsurge via deficit monetization and sterilization. The chain of events 
discussed in this section clearly suggests that it was both the actual and perceived 
mismanagement of borrowed funds that ultimately caused the credit-rationing 
phenomenon and the subsequent balance of payments crisis-and  not the other 
way around.  International credit tightening was a natural outcome whenever 
financial markets perceived that a government was not adjusting its plans to 
avoid default. 
The key question for Argentine policymakers after 1891  was how they could 
overcome such a crisis.  Could they resolve the policy inconsistencies behind 
the crisis, restore macroeconomic stability to the economy, lay the ground work 
for a more secure financial system, and sufficiently repair Argentina’s tattered 
reputation  in global capital markets so as  to regain access to foreign credit? 
These were the urgent tasks for the remainder of the decade that we consider 
in the next chapter. 
20. The nominal rate of interest on British consols were reduced from 3 percent to 2.75 percent in 
1887 by Governor Goschen of the Bank of England. The side effects of the debt conversion 
on Argentina were discussed by  Kindleberger (1984, pp.  16647): “But while the annual 
cost [of the debt conversion] to the Treasury is  reduced, there may well be side effects.  In 
particular, holders of retired debt may not be prepared quietly to accept a lower level of income 
and, in an  effort to prevent this, may switch from government  stock into higher-yield  and 
riskier investments.. _.  Another peacetime conversion under Goschen in 1887  fed the boom in 
securities that culminated in the Baring Crisis of 1890.” 
21. Williams (1920, pp.  6243) stressed the important point that European syndicates also in- 
tervened in the foreign exchange market to keep down the value of the paper peso with the 
aim to influence expectations in London: “To make these securities more salable European 
syndicates shipped gold to Buenos Aires. The  increase in the supply of gold would cause paper 
to appreciate for a time.  The fall of the gold premium would create the impression that the 
paper currency was on the mend. People would take a more hopeful view of the situation in 
general, and Argentine securities would begin to rise in value.” This Page Intentionally Left Blank